we entertain the thought to explain such individual differences without mediating representations or computations, but in the end propose a hybrid model of radical embodiment and internal representations.Is a hybrid model a viable theoretical option? Radical embodied cognition denies computation and representation, so such a model violates the basic tenets of that framework. And I would argue that since a "hybrid model" includes representations, then this is just traditional cognitive psychology. In a "hybrid" model, representations still exist in the mind/brain and they must be processed. This is the foundation of the standard cognitive, computational, or information processing model of the mind. What is embodied is that the "hybrid model" talks more about the body's contribution, which is useful. But traditional cognitive psychologists don't deny that the body plays an important role. How else could you get retinal disparity as an important cue to depth or interaural level differences as an important cue to sound localization? In this sense ALL traditional cognitive/computational/information processing models are hybrid embodied-representational models.
So while I welcome thoughtful discussions of the contribution of the body and the environment to cognition, calling a model a hybrid of radical embodied cognition and representational approaches is just terminological gobbledygook.