Because perception is assumed to be flawed, it is not considered a central resource for solving tasks.Who argues this? Perceptual scientists? By "perception" to you mean perceptual systems? Or do you mean the physical signals that perception uses?
Because we only have access to the environment via perception, the environment also is not considered a central resource.Who argues this? Of course the environment is a resource for perception. That's where the input comes from.
This places the burden entirely on the brain to act as a storehouse for skills and information.Who argues this? Do you think traditional cognitive psychologists would deny that information can be stored external to the brain in say written form? Or that the body or environment constrains the brain's solutions to information processing problems? Of course, you DO need a brain to read those notes.
This job description makes the content of internal cognitive representations the most important determinant of the structure of our behavior. Cognitive science is, therefore, in the business of identifying this content and how it is accessed and used
Advances in perception-action research, particularly Gibson’s work on direct perception (Gibson, 1966, 1979), changes the nature of the problem facing the organism.These "advances" are 30 years old. Maybe it would be worth looking at more recent models of perception?
Your conclusion doesn't follow from your premises. Why does the fact that there is information in the environment and that information processing is constrained by the body mean that you don't need concepts, internal representations, or knowledge? Also, a dab of circularity here. "If perception-action couplings..." (your assumption) then we replace standard notions with "perception-action couplings" (your conclusion). You've at least partially assumed your conclusion.if perception-action couplings and resources distributed over brain, body, and environment are substantial participants in cognition, then the need for the specific objects and processes of standard cognitive psychology (concepts, internally represented competence, and knowledge) goes away, to be replaced by very different objects and processes (most commonly perception-action couplings forming non-linear dynamical systems
This, in a nutshell, is the version of embodiment that Shapiro (2011) refers to as the replacement hypothesis and our argument here is that this hypothesis is inevitable once you allow the body and environment into the cognitive mix.See above. It doesn't follow. So, if I understand the claim, cognition is spread over environment, body, and brain. Further, traditional theorists didn't put enough emphasis on environment and body and too much on brain. Ok, that's reasonable. But unless you want to remove the brain/mind altogether, you still need a theory of the brain/mind's contribution to cognition. Since, according to your own assumptions (i.e., that the brain/mind does something), that theory cannot be fully derived from environment or body. This means that you will need a traditional information processing model in between. Therefore at best "embodied cognition" is a variant of standard cognitive models.
To earn the name, embodied cognition research must, we argue, look very different from this standard approach.Seems like it hasn't earned its name.