tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9048879464910781933.post6468931292800126352..comments2023-10-12T00:25:24.119-07:00Comments on Talking Brains: Mirror neurons support action understanding -- "from the inside"?Greg Hickokhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16656473495682901613noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9048879464910781933.post-48670722298622914492010-04-11T06:42:19.595-07:002010-04-11T06:42:19.595-07:00When reading your Eight problems for the mirror n...When reading your Eight problems for the mirror neuron theory It would have been very useful to find your opinion on what action understanding is, that will help so much as to take advantange of the large amount of papers writen on the subject.<br />A.M AcostaAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9048879464910781933.post-11252390902480851092010-03-28T09:37:54.625-07:002010-03-28T09:37:54.625-07:00Understanding is not clearly defined by Rizzolatti...Understanding is not clearly defined by Rizzolatti which is one of the problems of the account.Greg Hickokhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16656473495682901613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9048879464910781933.post-37970241239636607452010-03-28T08:39:08.493-07:002010-03-28T08:39:08.493-07:00Being a old guy, I'm still attempting to unde...Being a old guy, I'm still attempting to understand the ''mirror neuron " phenominon. My understanding is that when a monkey sees or hears another monkey snap open the shell of a peanut, the same neurons are activated in the watching/hearing monkey as in the monkey carrying out the snapping.<br /><br />But, does this mean that the watching/hearing monkey necessarily demonstrates the same - or similar - neruomuscular activity in those muscles involved in doing the 'snapping'.<br /><br />Now let me jump to humans and the implications this may have for our capacity for "understanding" - a term often used in discussions about mirror neurons. What do we mean by, and how do we define, the term "understanding"? Are we referring to the capacity to mentalize which Peter Fonagy and his collegues at Baylor have described as ' the capacity to infer that behavoirs of others and of oneself are a reflection of unobserved inferred mental states ( in the other and in oneself) and that other's mantal state may be different than one's own'? Without such understanding we are at risk for logical thinking to regress to teleological state.<br /><br />Or are we referring to the capacity to empathize, which has been described as 'the capacity to non-judgementally experience the other persons conscious and pre-conscious perspective of him/her-self and of his/her world, regardless of the foreingness that experience may have for us? Kohut refers to this as 'vicarious introspection' learning of the other's experience by looking inward.<br /><br />Thanks for your comments.Howard Booknoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9048879464910781933.post-33894520753220391442010-03-23T11:04:16.065-07:002010-03-23T11:04:16.065-07:00I'm glad you guys like the idea. Funny though...I'm glad you guys like the idea. Funny though -- this is just an elaboration of what I claimed in my Eight Problems paper. It didn't get much attention there. Cecelia Hayes' recent paper is also a much elaborated version of the sensory-motor theory. I'll have to look more closely at her paper to understand exactly what she is claiming; I bet it is very similar to what I said here in this last post. <br /><br />I think what Tom said in response to my previous post is right: No one is going to abandon the action understanding theory without a serious competitor theory. And while I did propose a competitor theory, I certainly failed to emphasize it, focusing instead on the why Rizzolatti's theory fails. Tactical error on my part I suppose.Greg Hickokhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16656473495682901613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9048879464910781933.post-77599259700293976142010-03-23T09:59:50.212-07:002010-03-23T09:59:50.212-07:00I like this idea too.
I assume you have seen Celi...I like this idea too.<br /><br />I assume you have seen Celia Heye's substantial body of studies suggesting that the properties of MNs reflect sensorimotor associations rather than anything innate and and special to social cognition. http://www.ceciliaheyes.co.uk/ This includes things like the Catmur study that R&S try to dismiss. I'm not sure what Celia thinks about the functional role of MNs though.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9048879464910781933.post-37153445937541219062010-03-23T08:15:27.194-07:002010-03-23T08:15:27.194-07:00The point about #3 is not that there isn't nec...The point about #3 is not that there isn't necessarily some "knowledge" encoded in the sensory-motor ensemble, but that this knowledge is restricted to information regarding HOW to perform an action not WHAT an action means. <br /><br />Yes, having a sensory-motor associate of a concept does add some kind of knowledge, but having this knowledge of HOW to perform an action does not in an of itself tell you the goals and intentions of the actor, which is what Rizzolatti is claiming.Greg Hickokhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16656473495682901613noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9048879464910781933.post-67972952380821258492010-03-23T08:04:01.664-07:002010-03-23T08:04:01.664-07:00Hi Greg,
I really like this idea!
I think it als...Hi Greg,<br /><br />I really like this idea!<br /><br />I think it also needs to explain why actions with an assumed real-world goal (i.e. grasping an actual object) seem to cause MN firing, whereas arbitrary 'pantomime' gestures do not. <br /><br />One possible explanation maybe that the MN activation upon observation is some function of the strength/efficiency of the motor programs present in the animal. This would assume that motor programs for real-world actions repeatedly performed throughout the animal's life will have stronger representations than those induced by relatively short periods of experiment-specific training, or no training at all - i.e. in your terms, you understand 'how' a lot better if you've had more practice.tomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9048879464910781933.post-13367340188304398142010-03-23T04:00:58.623-07:002010-03-23T04:00:58.623-07:00It looks like you have three main points here:
1....It looks like you have three main points here:<br /><br />1. Mirror neurons are just neuronal ensembles that link perception and action. <br /><br />2. These sensory-motor associates don't constitute meaning. It the activation of the conceptual structure that is important. ("It doesn't take on meaning until you link the sensory-motor ensemble to a conceptual structure.")<br /><br />3. Knowledge of how to perform an action is not part of the conceptual system ("there is no magical semantic knowledge that suddenly falls from heaven when we know how to perform an action")<br /><br />So I think claim 3 is false. If you have never seen the colour blue, you will have a different concept of blue from someone who has. If you have never played a chord on a piano, you will have a different concept of a chord to a piano player. If I have never glemphed, then I will have a different understanding of glemphing to someone that has. <br /><br />But perhaps you are right about the claims that mirror neurons are just sensory-motor associates and have no meaning on their own. However, if they do have a functional role, then it is to link perception and action. This linking of perception and action could lead to the activation of the motor system (in some cases). The activation of the motor system could then influence action understanding. You might not have a different understanding of the concept 'x' just because you have a sensory-motor associate of the concept, but having and using the motor side of the association can lead to different knowledge associated with 'x'. This might be a weaker claim about mirror neurons than some make, but I think it is more defensible.shanenoreply@blogger.com